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Three Essays on 
Nonwage Compensation
Matthew S. Johnson
An employment relationship consists of many dimensions 
other than monetary compensation. Textbook economic 
theory implies that employers and employees will agree on 
an efficient level of such nonwage compensation based on 
an employee’s preferences and the employer’s cost. At the 
same time, most types of nonwage compensation are set in a 
context of substantial regulation, legal restrictions, and other 
interventions. This dissertation investigates how the institu-
tional environment—including regulation, media coverage 
of corporate actions, and the strength of the labor market—
affects firms’ decisions regarding two important types of 
nonwage compensation: workplace safety and health, and 
employment mobility.
Chapter 1 investigates how media coverage of employers 
caught violating workplace safety and health regulations 
affects future compliance and injuries. Using quasi-random 
variation in media coverage induced by a policy change at 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
I find that media coverage about one employer leads to 
significantly higher compliance, and fewer serious injuries 
among other employers likely exposed to the coverage. The 
results are most consistent with employers acting defensively 
to avoid costly responses from workers, and they suggest 
there is information asymmetry between employers and 
workers regarding employers’ safety and health performance.
Chapter 2 examines how workplaces respond to health 
and safety regulatory enforcement inspections. Using  
establishment-level data on injuries, illnesses, and other 
business outcomes, we find that randomly assigned OSHA 
inspections led to significantly fewer injuries and had no 
detectable effect on business outcomes at inspected work-
places. We then use new machine learning methods to 
estimate heterogeneous treatment effects of inspections, and 
we use the results to simulate how many additional inju-
ries OSHA could avert if it targeted its limited inspection 
resources to the workplaces where they are most beneficial.
Chapter 3 investigates why employers have employees 
sign noncompete agreements (NCAs), which contractually 
limit where the employee can work in the event of a job 
separation. NCAs may solve hold-up problems that limit 
incentives to invest in transferrable assets (e.g., general 
human capital), but they impose costs on employees who 
sign them. Recent evidence that NCAs are frequently used 
in many traditionally lower-paying occupations has raised 
questions about the rationale for, and effects of, NCA use 
in this setting. We develop a model of how labor market 
conditions and wage frictions (e.g., the minimum wage) can 
jointly determine the decision to include an NCA in a hiring 
contract, even if NCAs reduce the firm’s total surplus. We 
find strong support for the model’s predictions using a survey 
we conducted among employers in the high-end hair salon 
industry. Furthermore, we generate a test for identifying 
when NCAs do not maximize a firm’s surplus, and we iden-
tify a subset of firms in our sample, characterized by limited 
access to credit, for which this is the case.
Note: Since this dissertation was accepted in August 2016, 
I have updated the three chapters to varying degrees (e.g., by 
adding new analysis) that strengthen the papers but do not 
change the motivations, implications, or main results. The 
chapter summaries below correspond to the current versions. 
After each summary, I briefly describe how the current ver-
sions differ from my dissertation.
Chapter 1
Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects  
of Publicizing Violations of Workplace Safety 
and Health Laws
Ratings, scores, disclosure, and other means of inform-
ing a firm’s stakeholders about an aspect of its quality or 
performance have proliferated in recent years (Dranove and 
Jin 2010). Such policies are guided by the basic economic 
insight that, when quality is imperfectly observed, providing 
information mitigates a moral hazard problem that distorts 
firms’ incentives to invest in quality. Indeed, a growing 
empirical literature has found that providing information 
about quality to the public leads rated, scored, or otherwise 
disclosed firms to improve the quality of the attributes under 
scrutiny.1 
Many sources seek to disclose information only about 
firms whose quality or performance is particularly low: 
that is, “shaming.” For example, nongovernmental organi-
zations and media outlets compile lists of firms that fail in 
some dimension according to objective data sources, such 
as “Least Green Companies in America” (Newsweek 2010), 
or the campaigns against companies that used sweatshop 
labor in the 1990s (Harrison and Scorse 2010). Increas-
ingly, technology and social media have enabled customers, 
former workers, and other stakeholders to expose compa-
nies’ actions ranging from tax avoidance (Barford and Holt 
2013), high medical drug prices,2 and sexual harassment of 
employees.3 While one intent of such tactics is to pressure 
the entity being targeted to improve its behavior (“specific 
deterrence”), a broader and perhaps more important intent is 
to encourage improvements in quality at other entities that 
wish to avoid being the target of their own future nega-
tive publicity (“general deterrence”). Despite the growing 
prevalence of these policies, little is known about how firms 
respond to such information disclosure targeted only at the 
worst performers. Estimating their effects poses substan-
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tial empirical challenges due to the purposely nonrandom 
selection of entities that are publicized, to the difficulty in 
knowing which other entities are the most likely respond 
to general deterrence, and to a dearth in data on outcomes 
typically under scrutiny.
This paper overcomes these challenges. Specifically, 
I investigate a policy dubbed “regulation by shaming” 
implemented by OSHA (Michaels 2010). In 2009 OSHA, 
the regulatory agency charged with setting and enforcing 
workplace safety and health standards in the United States, 
began issuing press releases about facilities found to be vio-
lating safety and health standards in a recent inspection. The 
policy was intended to expose egregious violators to public 
scrutiny and to publicize OSHA’s enforcement actions. These 
press releases described the violations found in a recent 
inspection of a facility and the financial penalties levied, and 
they implied that the employer was exposing its workers to 
substantial safety and health hazards.
The initiation of OSHA’s press release policy provides an 
ideal setting to understand the scale, scope, and persistence 
with which publicizing poor performance affects firms’ 
behavior. First, OSHA used a cutoff rule whereby it issued 
a press release about a facility’s violations if the financial 
penalties it levied at a recent inspection were above a certain 
threshold. This rule provides quasi-random variation in pub-
licity among otherwise similar facilities that lends itself to a 
Regression Discontinuity design. Second, OSHA distributed 
these press releases to local newspapers and industry trade 
publications, meaning that other facilities in close geographic 
proximity and in the same industry were most likely to be 
exposed to publicity of a press release. The policy was only 
announced internally within OSHA and not made known to 
the general public. As a result, it led to a sharp and unex-
pected increase in media coverage of OSHA violations, and 
meant that a well-defined set of facilities were made aware 
of this new threat of media coverage. Third, OSHA routinely 
inspects a broad set of workplaces to detect health and safety 
violations and collects the results in an internal database, 
providing a timely and systematic data source to measure 
facility improvements in response to press releases.
Understanding the extent to which publicity like this 
affects workplace safety and health is not only useful to 
understand how firms respond to targeted information dis-
closure, but it is also an important question for public policy; 
although U.S. workplace injury rates have declined in recent 
decades, they continue to have substantial welfare costs, with 
one recent study estimating that they cost the United States 
$250 billion per year (Leigh 2011).
I find that press releases revealing OSHA noncompliance 
lead to substantial improvements in workplace safety and 
health. A press release about one facility leads to 1.7 fewer 
violations at other facilities in the same sector within a 5 
kilometer radius (“peer facilities”), a decrease of 73 percent. 
To put the magnitude of this deterrence effect in perspective, 
an OSHA inspection has been estimated to lead to between 
28 and 48 percent fewer violations at later inspections of the 
same facility (Ko, Mendeloff, and Gray 2012). Thus, this 
paper’s estimates imply that publicizing violations commit-
ted by one facility leads other peer facilities to improve com-
pliance by two to three times as much as if OSHA inspected 
each of these facilities instead. Given that inspections are 
relatively costly and that OSHA’s budget constraints—like 
those in many other regulatory agencies—dictate that it can 
inspect only a small subset of regulated workplaces, this pub-
licity appears to be a highly effective policy tool to improve 
workplace safety.
Furthermore, using the occurrence of OSHA inspections 
triggered by a fatal, or otherwise very serious, workplace 
injury, I find that press releases lead not only to improved 
compliance with OSHA regulations, but also to fewer inju-
ries. An inspection with penalties just above the press release 
cutoff leads to significantly fewer inspections triggered by a 
serious accident among other peer facilities. The magnitude 
of the effect, as with compliance, is substantial. 
The paper then tests for mechanisms through which 
OSHA’s press releases lead facilities to improve their safety 
and health performance. One theory is that facilities improve 
compliance to avoid costly responses from stakeholders, 
especially workers. Workers who have more bargaining power 
may have more scope to leverage a press release to demand 
safer working conditions, or a larger compensating differential 
for job hazards, from an employer. Drawing from literature on 
how the presence of labor unions affects workers’ bargaining 
power (both at unionized and nonunionized workplaces), I 
measure workers’ bargaining power using two proxies for the 
strength of labor unions: whether a facility is in a right-to-
work state, and the baseline unionization rate of a facility’s 
county. Using either measure, facilities in areas where unions 
are strong improve compliance by a substantial amount 
following a press release about a peer (regardless of their own 
unionization); those in areas where unions are relatively weak 
display no improvement. In other words, press releases lead 
to improvements in safety and health conditions only when 
workers are most likely to be able to use information about an 
employer’s safety record to respond in a costly way.
This paper makes multiple contributions. First, it provides 
a novel contribution to a literature on the disciplinary effects 
of information provision. While a growing body of work 
(such as those papers cited in note 1) has investigated the 
extent to, and conditions under, which information disclo-
sure leads firms to improve their performance or quality, this 
paper is one of the first to identify how providing informa-
tion about some targeted firms can have broader effects on 
the behavior of other firms. A separate literature has explored 
the effect of “shaming” in other domains, such as public 
release of criminal records (Lee 2013) and tax delinquency 
(Perez-Truglia and Troaino 2016). In the realm of politics, 
media coverage has been shown to affect politicians’ incen-
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tives to engage in malfeasant behavior (Snyder and Strom-
berg 2010). This paper builds on these literatures by explor-
ing how shaming—and targeted information disclosure in 
general—affects firm behavior in a regulatory environment.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the 
determinants of regulatory compliance in firms. Many prior 
studies have investigated the specific deterrence effects of 
OSHA inspections on future compliance of inspected facil-
ities (Gray and Jones 1991; Ko, Mendeloff, and Gray 2010; 
Weil 1996), as well as effects in other regulatory domains 
such as by the Environmental Protection Agency (see Alm 
and Shimshack [2014] for an overview). At least in the 
environmental domain, the consensus in this literature seems 
to be that “rigorous monitoring and enforcement remains 
the number one motivator for many facilities’ environmental 
compliance decisions” (Gray and Shimshack 2011, p. 1). 
This paper’s findings suggest the media and “shaming” have 
been overlooked as powerful forces governing firms’ compli-
ance decisions, at least for safety and health. 
Note: The version of this chapter submitted for my disser-
tation used shared zip code, rather than geographic distance, 
as a measure of geographic proximity when estimating 
general deterrence effects of press releases (the substance of 
the results is unchanged). That version also did not analyze 
the effects of press releases on occupational injuries, and it 
also did not analyze how labor union strength moderates the 
effect of press releases on compliance.
Chapter 2
Improving Regulatory Effectiveness through 
Better Targeting: Evidence from OSHA 
(with David I. Levine and Michael W. Toffel)
Government agencies spend billions of dollars to send 
inspectors to assess compliance with regulations governing, 
for example, worker safety, environmental protection, and 
product safety.4 Budget constraints require almost all regula-
tors to monitor a small subset of regulated units. For exam-
ple, in 2016 OSHA and its state counterparts inspected less 
than 1 percent of the 8 million workplaces they regulated. 
(U.S. Department of Labor 2017b). Other agencies face 
similar discrepancies between the scale of their resources and 
scope of their jurisdiction.5
Such constraints require regulators to make difficult 
choices about how to prioritize their inspections. Agencies 
prioritize inspections based on various statutory require-
ments, heuristics, and algorithms. For example, OSHA 
allocates most of its inspections to facilities that recently 
experienced serious accidents, had employee complaints, or 
dangerous workplaces in high-hazard industries.6 
Assessing agencies’ effectiveness is a challenging task. 
First, it is difficult to know if agencies’ inspections are 
furthering their goals at all; agencies choose which estab-
lishments to inspect, which makes it hard to find a credible 
comparison group of uninspected establishments for eval-
uation purposes. Second, it is even more difficult to know 
if agencies are maximizing their effectiveness. Even if one 
could credibly evaluate the average effects of inspections as 
agencies currently target them, conventional econometric 
methods do not tell us if current targeting is optimal. The 
lack of robust evidence of inspection effectiveness has left 
government agencies susceptible to criticism that their efforts 
waste taxpayer dollars, that they target establishments to pro-
mote politicians’ agendas (Weisman and Wald 2013), or that 
they serve the interests of those they regulate (Stigler 1971).
In this paper, we combine a large randomized experiment 
with machine learning methods, which yields an approach to 
assess the extent to which regulatory agencies are maximiz-
ing the benefits of their limited inspection resources. We do 
so by first identifying establishments where inspections do 
the most to accomplish the agency’s objectives, and we then 
simulate outcomes if the agency adopted various policies that 
targeted those establishments. 
We conduct our analysis in the context of a major inspec-
tion program of OSHA, which has been highly controversial 
since its creation in 1970. While its supporters argue the 
agency saves lives at little to no cost to employers, critics 
charge that its regulations add costs but “don’t add value to 
safety in the workforce” (Heitkamp 2016), or that its penal-
ties for noncompliance are too low for OSHA to have any 
effect at all (Bartel and Thomas 1985).
We first evaluate the extent to which a subset of inspec-
tions that OSHA randomly assigned under its Site-Specific  
Targeting (SST) program affected the injury rates of 
inspected workplaces. SST, one of OSHA’s largest inspec-
tion programs from 2001 to 2010, prioritized for inspection 
establishments that had experienced high injury rates two 
years earlier, a rule intended to allow “the most effective use 
of OSHA’s limited resources” (U.S. Department of Labor 
2009). By focusing on random assignment, our estimates 
are free of selection bias that plague most comparisons of 
inspected and uninspected establishments.7 The roughly 
16,000 establishments at risk of randomized SST inspec-
tion over this period employed nearly 2.5 million workers, 
making this the largest group-level randomized control trial 
of which we are aware.
On average, we find that randomly assigned SST inspec-
tions reduced serious injuries (those leading to days away 
from work [DAFW]) by 9 percent over the five years follow-
ing the inspection. This equates to 2.4 fewer DAFW-injuries 
over the five years following inspection, amounting to a 
social benefit of $105,000 per inspection, based on a prior 
estimate that DAFW-injuries typically cost $44,000 (Waeh-
rer et al. 2007). We find no evidence that these benefits of 
inspections came with a cost to business outcomes such as 
establishment survival, employment, sales, or credit rating.
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We then investigate the potential benefits of alternative 
targeting policies that OSHA could adopt. Conducting this 
analysis is challenged by the fact that a particular estab-
lishment’s treatment effect of an inspection on its number 
of injuries—that is, the difference in the number of injuries 
it would experience if had been inspected versus had it not 
been inspected—is unobservable. When there are many fac-
tors that could moderate an inspection’s effect, conventional 
methods to estimate such heterogeneous treatment effects 
(such as adding interaction terms) risk estimating spurious 
interactions that have poor out-of-sample predictive power.
To overcome this challenge, we employ a machine- 
learning approach that yields data-driven estimates of each 
establishment’s treatment effect based on its baseline char-
acteristics called Targeted Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(TMLE) (van der Laan and Rose 2011). We first obtain an 
initial estimate of each establishment’s outcome if inspected 
and outcome if not inspected, using a procedure called 
“super learner” (van der Laan, Polley, and Hubbard 2007). 
Super learner is an ensemble machine-learning prediction 
technique that uses cross-validation to create an optimal lin-
ear combination of machine-learning prediction algorithms. 
TMLE then fluctuates this initial estimate to minimize bias 
of the estimated average treatment effect. As a result, TMLE 
provides estimates to overcome the fundamental problem of 
causal inference (Holland 1986), estimating the counterfac-
tual number of injuries if inspected among those that were 
not inspected, and number of injuries if not inspected among 
those that were inspected. 
We estimate substantial heterogeneity in the degree to 
which SST inspection affects serious injuries. Armed with 
these estimates, we examine how different targeting policies 
could improve OSHA’s effectiveness. For example, if OSHA 
reallocated all its SST inspections to target those establish-
ments with the largest predicted treatment effects each year, 
which we consider our “benchmark” policy, it could have 
averted 58 percent more injuries at inspected establishments 
than the historical rule. 
While this benchmark policy could avert many more 
injuries at inspected establishments, elements of it may be 
undesirable. For example, shifting the allocation of inspec-
tions may increase OSHA’s cost of conducting inspections, 
requiring extra resources OSHA may not have. Furthermore, 
OSHA may want to preserve a degree of randomization to 
maintain effects that the threat of inspection has on unin-
spected establishments (Cohen 2000; Shimshack and Ward 
2005). When we examine a policy that maintains OSHA’s 
historical overall cost of conducting inspections, and which 
preserves a degree of randomization, we find it still increases 
the injuries averted among inspected establishments by 42 
percent relative to the historical policy.
Another potential concern with our benchmark policy is 
that a government agency might be leery of targeting inspec-
tions based on the output of a “black box” machine-learning 
algorithm like TMLE. We thus consider policies in which 
OSHA bases its targeting policy on two transparent mea-
sures of hazardousness: predicted number of DAFW injuries 
or predicted noncompliance with OSHA regulations. We 
estimate these predicted values using a Lasso regression, a 
standard (and simpler) machine learning tool for prediction. 
OSHA would still avert 70 percent as many injuries if tar-
geting based on the predicted number of DAFW injuries as 
it would by targeting based on the largest treatment effects. 
Targeting based on predicted noncompliance, in contrast, 
only increased averted injuries slightly compared to the 
historical rule. 
In sum, considering a policy that accounts for each of 
these potential concerns of our benchmark policy, our esti-
mates imply that targeting OSHA’s SST inspections differ-
ently could have created social value of roughly $220 million 
over a decade. 
This paper makes multiple contributions. We add to a 
large literature examining the effects of OSHA inspections 
on injuries, which to date has yielded a wide range of esti-
mates. While many early studies find that OSHA inspections 
have little or no correlation with subsequent workplace 
injury rates (Ruser and Smith 1991; Smith 1979b; Viscusi 
1986), others find that OSHA inspections are associated with 
a decline in injury rates (Gray and Scholz 1993; Haviland et 
al. 2012; Levine, Toffel, and Johnson 2012). We depart from 
this literature in two important ways. First, by evaluating 
the average effects of a subset of OSHA inspections that 
were randomly assigned, our approach yields credible causal 
estimates for the subset of inspections we study. Second, 
we go beyond evaluating historical effects of inspections to 
examine the implications of alternative inspection policies, 
allowing us to determine the extent to which OSHA could 
reallocate inspections to avert more injuries. 
Note: The version of this chapter submitted for my disser-
tation did not include the results that use TMLE to estimate 
heterogeneous treatment effects of inspections. Rather, that 
version used a different machine-learning procedure (Lasso) 
to estimate establishments’ predicted injuries and predicted 
noncompliance, and analyzed the extent to which these 
measures accounted for heterogeneity in the effectiveness of 
inspections.
Chapter 3
Cutting Out the Competition:  
Labor Market Conditions and the Use  
of Noncompete Agreements 
(with Michael Lipsitz)
When a new worker receives his or her employment con-
tract, it may include a noncompete agreement (NCA), which 
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contractually limits the worker’s ability to enter a profes-
sional position in competition with his or her employer in the 
event of a job separation. Economic theory of the hold-up 
problem (Grossman and Hart 1986) suggests that NCAs 
can potentially enhance efficiency by aligning incentives 
to invest in various assets, such as general human capital 
training, trade secrets, or client lists. At the same time, NCAs 
may also impose significant costs on workers by limiting 
their ability to pursue outside employment opportunities. 
Recent evidence suggests that our understanding of the 
reasons behind—and implications of—NCA use remains 
incomplete. For one, while NCAs are most prevalent in 
higher-skill, knowledge-intensive industries and occupations, 
they are also frequently used in many traditionally lower- 
paying occupations (Starr, Bishara, and Prescott 2015), even 
among fast food workers (Irwin 2014), leading some to ques-
tion what benefit NCAs could be bringing to these employ-
ment relationships. Furthermore, the use of NCAs has been 
growing in recent years (Greenhouse 2014), which, absent 
corresponding changes in the importance of training, trade 
secrets, client lists, or other facets of production technol-
ogy, is difficult to rationalize with the theory of the hold-up 
problem alone. 
These developments have captured policymakers’ atten-
tion: in Congress, the Mobility and Opportunity for Vulner-
able Employees (MOVE) Act,8 introduced on June 4, 2015, 
would prohibit NCAs for workers earning less than $15 per 
hour, and bills with similar intents have been introduced by 
several state legislatures.9 Despite this policy interest, little is 
known about the efficiency of NCAs in this context, let alone 
the rationale for their use in the first place.
In this paper, we show that NCAs arise when employers 
and employees are limited in their ability to transfer util-
ity via the wage. When the market-clearing wage is con-
strained, NCAs may be used as a tool to transfer additional 
surplus to the employer, even if NCAs do not maximize an 
employer and employee’s joint surplus. In fact, such con-
straints on wages will only affect NCA use if NCAs are not 
surplus-maximizing. Thus, we provide a simple method that 
generates a sufficient condition to determine when NCAs do 
not maximize surplus in firms: if a change in the bindingness 
of a wage constraint affects NCA use, NCAs cause a joint 
surplus loss (relative to a contract without an NCA) for at 
least a subset of firms. We implement this test using data 
from a survey we conducted of employers in the hair salon 
industry. 
We start with a simple, perfectly competitive model of 
the labor market in which NCAs provide a benefit to the 
employer and impose a cost on the employee. If utility is 
fully transferable between the employer and employee via 
the wage, NCAs will be used only when the firm’s net benefit 
of NCA use is positive: when NCAs maximize joint surplus. 
However, when utility transferability via the wage is limited, 
the terms of trade in the labor market may dictate that NCAs 
are used as a tool to transfer surplus from the employee to 
the employer, even if NCAs do not maximize firms’ surplus. 
NCA use will therefore increase when the terms of trade 
become more favorable to the employer or when transferabil-
ity of utility decreases.
While firms plausibly have many possible nonpecuni-
ary instruments for surplus transfer at their disposal, there 
are reasons to believe NCAs would be a prominent one. 
First, prior research has identified clear ways NCAs bene-
fit employers. For example, because NCAs lead to longer 
worker tenure (Starr, Bishara, and Prescott 2015), they can 
reduce employee replacement costs, which can be substantial 
(Dube, Freeman, and Reich 2010). Additionally, in industries 
for which production depends on transferable assets such 
as client lists and general human capital, ensuring retention 
of these assets is extremely valuable. Second, relative to 
other nonpecuniary job attributes such as provision of health 
care, it is relatively easy for employers to switch in and out 
of using NCAs; NCA use requires straightforward changes 
to employment contracts, whereas adjustments to health 
insurance benefits requires much more coordination, time, 
and resources.
To test the empirical predictions of our model, we sur-
veyed owners of independent hair salons in April 2015 via 
the Professional Beauty Association, a trade association for 
the industry. The benefits of NCAs are clear in this setting 
due to the importance of client attraction and retention in 
production, and the prevalence of on-the-job training. At the 
same time, due to state-level occupational licensing laws that 
make mobility costly, the costs of NCAs to workers are also 
potentially high. We find that NCAs are widely used: 30 per-
cent of our sample had their most recently hired stylist sign 
an NCA, and 39 percent have had at least one stylist sign an 
NCA in the past.
Taking the model to the data, we find strong empirical 
support that limitations on transferability of utility via the 
wage affect NCA use. First, we test the prediction that NCA 
use is higher when the terms of trade in the labor market 
are more favorable for the employer. We find that outward 
shifts in labor supply (proxied by the number of appli-
cants an owner received for her most recent vacancy), and 
increases to the local unemployment rate—both of which 
will be associated with a lower market-clearing wage—are 
related to higher NCA use. We estimate that one additional 
applicant for a vacancy leads to a 4 percent increase in the 
probability that the hired worker signed an NCA. We also 
find that salons in counties that experienced higher increases 
in the unemployment rate between 2006 and 2012 (roughly 
the period spanning the Great Recession) were more likely to 
have their most recently hired worker sign an NCA.
Second, we find that increases in the minimum wage, 
which limit transferability of utility, also have a strong effect 
on NCA use. Owners in states with a higher minimum wage 
for tipped employees are more likely to use NCAs. Because 
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cross-sectional variation in the minimum wage might be 
driven by other, unobservable differences across states, we 
separately estimate the effect of the minimum wage on NCA 
use for salons that hire workers as employees versus those 
that hire as independent contractors. The latter group is not 
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act and thus acts as 
a “placebo group” for the minimum wage. The effect only 
holds for the employment-based salons in our sample and 
is small and statistically insignificant for contractor-based 
salons. Among employment-based salons, a $1.00 increase in 
the minimum wage is associated with an 8 percentage point 
increase in the probability that an owner has used a NCA in 
an employment contract.
Combined with the implications of our model, these 
results imply that NCAs do not maximize surplus for at 
least some firms in our sample. However, NCAs may still 
be surplus-maximizing contracts for a subset of firms. For 
example, if the benefits of NCAs are heterogeneous across 
employers, NCAs may maximize surplus for those firms with 
the highest benefit. 
To investigate the extent of variation in the benefit of 
NCAs in our sample, we first corroborate existing evi-
dence that one benefit of NCAs is to enhance incentives for 
employers to invest in production assets, and we then utilize 
a measure of employers’ ability to invest in production assets 
originating in the corporate finance literature: access to a line 
of credit with a bank (Sufi 2009). We find evidence consis-
tent with NCAs being surplus-maximizing for employers 
with high capacity for investment, but not for those with 
low capacity. Employers with high capacity use NCAs at a 
high rate, regardless of whether the market-clearing wage is 
likely constrained. On the other hand, employers with low 
capacity are highly unlikely to use NCAs in an unconstrained 
environment (proxied by a low minimum wage, low level 
of labor supply, or low local unemployment rate), but this 
likelihood increases as the wage becomes constrained. 
Overall, these results highlight a potential explanation 
for the growth of NCAs among lower-wage occupations 
and industries in recent years. Between 2007 and 2009, the 
federal minimum wage rose from $5.15 per hour to $7.25 per 
hour, and several states have increased their minimum wage 
in more recent years. Furthermore, in the wake of the Great 
Recession, there is a consensus that the labor market has 
deteriorated dramatically, especially for low-wage workers. 
Our results imply that employers leveraged this weak labor 
market to use NCAs as a tool to extract additional surplus 
from workers.
Thus, our results yield nuanced implications for policy. 
On the one hand, our survey results suggest that NCAs 
may arise as a tool for employers to extract surplus from 
workers in weak labor markets, reducing joint surplus and 
leaving workers worse off. At the same time, even within a 
narrowly defined industry, we find that NCAs do not maxi-
mize surplus for some firms but do for others. This finding 
stresses the need for future research to further investigate 
the benefits NCAs provide to firms, which can aid policy-
makers by pinpointing where NCAs are most likely to be 
surplus-diminishing. 
This paper contributes to a growing literature examining 
the rationale for NCAs and the effects of their use. Using 
variation in the enforceability of NCAs across states, an 
increase in NCA enforceability has been found to increase 
firm-sponsored training (Starr 2017) and decrease employee 
mobility (Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming 2009). We add to the 
literature by empirically demonstrating how forces external 
to the firm influence the decision to use NCAs in the first 
place, and by providing a method to identify the presence of 
NCAs that do not maximize a firm’s joint surplus. We also 
conduct the first survey on NCA use with employer infor-
mation, allowing us to explore determinants and effects of 
NCA use not available through worker surveys or variation 
in enforceability.
Note: The version of this chapter submitted for my dis-
sertation did not include the analysis of how changes to the 
local unemployment rate affect NCA use.
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.wharton.upenn.edu/article/social-media-shaming-can-out 
rage-be-effective/ (accessed October 25, 2017). 
 3.  “Uber Orders Investigation into Sexual Harassment Claims,” 
February 20, 2017. NPR, All Things Considered. http://www 
.npr.org/2017/02/20/516292319/uber-orders-investigation 
-into-sexual-harassment-claims (accessed October 25, 2017).
 4. Three examples are illustrative. OSHA and its state counterparts 
spent more than $300 million on enforcement in 2016 (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2017a). Second, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency spends more than $600 million per year on 
enforcement, which does not include inspections performed 
by state-level environmental agencies, which actually led the 
efforts to enforce environmental regulation in the United States 
(Shimshack 2014). Third, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) allocated roughly two-thirds of its $1 billion Office 
of Regulatory Affairs budget to inspections in fiscal year 2015 
(U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2016).
 5. For example, FDA is charged with ensuring imported products 
meet FDA standards but in 2010 only physically inspected 2 
percent of imported food products (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 2010).
 6. “OSHA Fact Sheet: OSHA Inspections,” https://www.osha 
.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf 
(accessed February 2017).
 7. For example, because many OSHA inspections target estab-
lishments with recent accidents or complaints, inspected 
establishments likely have systematically different character-
2017 Dissertation Summaries 21
istics (both observable and unobservable) than noninspected 
establishments. Furthermore, establishments experiencing high 
injury rates in one year (thus triggering an OSHA inspection) 
may experience fewer injuries the following year simply due to 
regression to the mean, in which case OSHA inspections would 
be correlated with lower injury rates without actually causing 
them.
 8. Senate Bill S. 1504. Full text available at https://www.govtrack 
.us/congress/bills/114/s1504.
 9. Some examples include Washington (HB 1926; introduced Feb-
ruary 2, 2015), Utah (HB 251; introduced February 1, 2016), 
and Illinois (Illinois Freedom to Work Act; goes into effect 
January 1, 2017).
References
Alm, James, and Jay Shimshack. 2014. “Environmental 
Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, 
Safety, and Tax Settings.” Foundations and Trends in 
Microeconomics 10(4): 209–274.
Barford, Vanessa, and Gerry Holt. 2013. “Google, Amazon, 
Starbucks: The Rise of ‘Tax Shaming.’” BBC Magazine, 
May 21. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359 
(accessed October 25, 2017). 
Bartel, Ann P., and Lacey Glenn Thomas. 1985. “Direct and 
Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA’s 
Impact.”  Journal of Law and Economics 28(1): 1–25.
Bennear, Lori S., and Sheila M. Olmstead. 2008. “The 
Impacts of the ‘Right to Know’: Information Disclosure 
and the Violation of Drinking Water Standards.” Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 56(2): 
117–130.
Chatterji, Aaron K., and Michael W. Toffel. 2010. “How 
Firms Respond to Being Rated.” Strategic Management 
Journal 31(9): 917–945.
Dranove, David, and Ginger Zhe Jin. 2010. “Quality Disclo-
sure and Certification: Theory and Practice.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 48(4): 935–963.
Dube, Arindrajit, Eric Freeman, and Michael Reich. 2010. 
“Employee Replacement Costs.” Working Paper No. 
201-10. Berkeley: Institute for Research on Labor and 
Employment.
Gray, Wayne B., and Carol Adaire Jones. 1991. “Longitudi-
nal Patterns of Compliance with Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration Health and Safety Regulations in 
the Manufacturing Sector.” Journal of Human Resources 
26(4): 623–653.
Gray, Wayne B., and John T. Scholz. 1993. “Does Regulatory 
Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforce-
ment.” Law and Society Review 27(1): 177–214.
Greenhouse, Steven. 2014. “Noncompete Clauses Increas-
ingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs.” New York Times, June 8. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/ 
noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs 
.html (accessed October 26, 2017). 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. 1986. “The Costs 
and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and 
Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94(4): 
691–719.
Harrison, Ann, and Jason Scorse. 2010. “Multinationals and 
Anti-Sweatshop Activism.” American Economic Review 
100(1): 247–273.
Haviland, Amelia M., Rachel M. Burns, Wayne B. Gray, 
Teague Ruder, and John Mendeloff. 2012. “A New Esti-
mate of the Impact of OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing 
Injury Rates, 1998–2005.” American Journal of Industrial 
Medicine 55(11): 964–975. 
Heitkamp, Heidi. 2016. Hearing with Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, February 
11. http://www.safetyandhealthmagazine.com/articles/ 
13662-compliance-assistance-not-fines-should-be-priority 
-senators-tell-osha (accessed October 31, 2017).
Irwin, Neil. “When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a 
Noncompete Clause.” New York Times, October 14. https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/when-the-guy 
-making-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html 
(accessed October 26, 2017). 
Jin, Ginger Zhe, and Philip Leslie. 2003. “The Effect of 
Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant 
Hygiene Cards.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2): 
409–451.
Ko, Kilkon, John Mendeloff, and Wayne B. Gray. 2010. “The 
Role of Inspection Sequence in Compliance with the U.S. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) 
Standards: Interpretations and Implications.” Regulation & 
Governance 4(1): 48–70.
Levine, David I., Michael W. Toffel, and Matthew S. John-
son. 2012. “Randomized Government Safety Inspections 
Reduce Worker Injuries with No Detectable Job Loss.” 
Science 336(6083): 907–911. 
Leigh, J. Paul. 2011. “Economic Burden of Occupational 
Injury and Illness in the United States.” Milbank Quarterly 
89(4): 728–772.
Marx, Matt, Deborah Anne Strumsky, and Lee Fleming. 
2009. “Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Noncompete 
Experiment.” Management Science 55(6): 875–889.
Michaels, David. 2010. “OSHA at Forty: New Challenges 
and New Directions.” Letter to OSHA staff, July 19.
Newsweek. 2010. “Least Green Companies in Amer-
ica: Photos.” October 16. http://www.newsweek.com/
least-green-companies-america-photos-68107 (accessed 
October 25, 2017). 
Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, and Ugo Troiano. 2016. “Sham-
ing Tax Delinquents: Theory and Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in the United States.” NBER Working Paper 
No. 21264. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Ruser, John W., and Robert S. Smith. 1991. “Reestimat-
ing Osha’s Effects: Have the Data Changed?” Journal of 
Human Resources 26(2): 212–235.
